The European Dilemma: Caught in the Crossfire of Asymmetric Warfare

Introduction:

On 28 February 2026, US and Israeli forces coordinated a strike against Iranian targets that killed former Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. With these strikes, Europe found itself in an extremely difficult position. Whereas European leaders called publicly for restraint, protection of civilians, and respect for international law, European territory, bases, and military assets became involved in the war that nearly all European governments have publicly said is 'not our war.'

This contradiction illustrates Europe’s current situation. The asymmetric war between Iran and the US-Israel coalition lays bare the fact that Europe is both strategically fragile and divided. Furthermore, there exists a large gap between Europe’s aspirations for diplomatic relevance and its actual abilities to accomplish these aspirations. In a continent that prides itself on its 'soft power' through multilateral diplomacy, the Iran crisis is forcing it to face hard realities about military dependence, energy security, and the limits of Europe’s ability to influence events when the US chooses to act alone.

The Rhetoric-Reality Gap: Europe's Contradictory Posture

The leaders of Europe have put forth great effort that reaches out to show they are neutral mediators. For example, on March 31, 2026, the President of the EU Council (Antonio Costa) had a phone call with Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, wherein he emphasised “the urgent need for de-escalation” and “the current situation in the Middle East is extremely dangerous and needs to be de-escalated.” President Costa emphasised the importance of protecting civilian populations and their infrastructure, and he described the murder of innocent civilians as a tragedy; "it's a shame that children in a school in Minab (southern Iran) lost their lives."

President of France (Emmanuel Macron) also took to social media to communicate the dangers that escalate, "are dangerous to everybody, cease immediately." President...Germany, France, and Britain created a joint statement that states they did not actively participate in any of the military activity mentioned above. Thus, on the surface, all three member countries appear united and committed to diplomatic relations.

However, there exists a different truth beneath the official responses to this crisis. As per studies by the EUISS (European Union Institute for Security Studies), there is a pattern of 'shock’, scepticism, some focus on their own issues and, most importantly, a withdrawal to discussions around principles to describe Europe's reactions. As Steven Everts (EUISS director) said, the discussion has been about 'how to interpret these events as opposed to what to do' and has put Europe in a position where 'they're on the sidelines' as decisions occur around them that affect the countries' primary interests.

The greatest illustration of this mismatch between statements and actions may be represented through military infrastructure. A few nations, including the UK, Germany, Italy, France, Greece and Portugal, have provided the U.S. military with access to their military bases, which have been used to refuel planes, provide munitions, and provide intelligence on the situation. This has been depicted by Iranian diplomatic analysis as 'hypocrisy' — wanting to participate in the spoils of war while hoping to enjoy protection from its aftermath.

Tehran's criticism is not only an argumentative one, but it's also common knowledge amongst European analysts alike. The commentary made by EUISS does highlight this contradiction as "the EU was not consulted at the beginning and is not involved in the direct military operation" of the conflict, but has had its assets involved indirectly in the conflict anyway. An example being a drone attack against a British military base located in Cyprus on March 1st, when Iran launched retaliatory strikes, European coalition forces who had been sent to protect local allies were found to be endangered, even though each of the respective governments involved insists they are not a party to the war.

Europe as a Military Actor: Mobilisation and Its Limits

Although Europe's diplomatic approach may have been uncertain throughout the conflict, its military response has definitely been active. The New York Times reported that this conflict has caused one of the most comprehensive mobilisations across Europe in recent times.

The French Commitment

France has positioned itself as the most visibly active European nation in terms of military engagement. In total, the French Navy currently has around 12 vessels deployed to the Mediterranean and Persian Gulf regions (which includes France's only nuclear-powered aircraft carrier), representing approximately 60% of France's currently active operational fleet. These deployed forces intend to: protect French nationals in the region; provide support to French allies, including defending against Turkish actions towards Cyprus; and ensure that the Strait of Hormuz - which is the most significant oil choke point globally - remains open for commercial shipping activities.

The French contribution also has sent a very strong message regarding the United States and Russia's capabilities, as the rapid deployment of French military assets demonstrates to both nations that European countries are “not weak”. Additionally, French security analyst Elie Tenenbaum from the French Institute of International Relations believes France's ability to project military force to the Gulf outweighs the risks associated with its reduced presence in the Baltic Sea due to its involvement in the Gulf region.

British Participation and Its Strains

As part of its involvement in the crisis surrounding the Syrian conflict, the United Kingdom has also contributed significant resources. Following the drone strike that occurred at the UK base in Cyprus, Prime Minister Keir Starmer announced the dispatch of one destroyer to the Eastern Mediterranean and four missile-equipped fighter aircraft and helicopters equipped with anti-drone capabilities from the UK to Cyprus, the USA and Greece. The UK aircraft are reportedly flying "in the air today" as part of "coordinated regional aircraft network-military operations."

However, the UK deployment has highlighted its weaknesses. The destroyer took "over a week to reach Cyprus" after the attack, which raises questions as to the readiness of the UK's Maritime forces. An analysis performed by the Royal United Services Institute stated that the UK's support to the Middle East air defence program is "a drop in the ocean" relative to the combined USA/Israel effort; furthermore, it stated that "the realities experienced by the Army will ultimately limit the UK's effectiveness in response to WAR."

The Resource Crunch

The military mobilisation conducted by European nations revealed how thin Europe's resources are. According to analysts from the New York Times, "European armies have been trying to be at full force in all places", especially in the Baltic Sea, with their show of force against Russia. Moving military equipment and weapons from Europe to the Gulf area will weaken Europe's ability to assist Ukraine in its fight against Moscow's aggression.

Italy's Senator Carlo Calenda said, "We are very vulnerable from a military perspective. Something could happen that would create a problem for us to defend ourselves.”

The supply chain is under pressure throughout the defence sector. Leonardo (the Italian defence contractor) CEO Roberto Cingolani stated that it seems that wars keep breaking out at a faster pace than we can increase capacity to produce. He continued, saying that there are European officials who have expressed concern that the war in the Middle East will significantly reduce the availability of air-to-air interceptors and leave Ukraine at significant risk from Russian military attacks.

Poland's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Radosław Sikorksi clearly articulated this conundrum when he stated that Poland would not send arms to bolster Europe's military effort in the Middle East to meet the demand that was created by the conflict, since "there is currently a war on our border."

The Divided Continent: Spain's Defiance and the Failure of Cohesion

While Europe's military mobilisation demonstrates the continent's ability to work together, the political divisions evident during this crisis show a deeper rift between the European countries. Instead of presenting themselves as one unified entity, they have separated themselves from each other, based upon their geopolitical differences, as evidenced by their different views on the military threat, past involvement in wars, and their approach to strategy.

The Spanish Exception

The situation in Spain is different from other countries' past statements on or reactions to the recent conflict in Gaza, Israel, where all leaders are either on board with supporting the Israeli side or are taking an ambiguous stance. The Spanish Government has publicly spoken out against the U.S. and Israeli/Gaza military operations, saying it has violated international law. The Spanish Prime Minister Sanchez has also approved the Socialist Party's revival of the "no a la guerra" ("no to war") slogan used against the Iraq War ("No to War") in 2003.

The Spanish government has backed up what they have said with action. Currently, Spain has denied the U.S., their primary military ally, the use of any Spanish military bases when the U.S. is most in need of them. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent of the United States has responded unusually by stating that because of Spain's refusal to cooperate with the U.S., American lives are now "in jeopardy" due to Spain's actions. Recent reports from the United States indicate that it will likely implement trade sanctions against Spain.

Spain's actions under Sanche are not solely in the form of passive resistance. Madrid is sending a frigate to Cyprus to assist in defending that island nation; it is a demonstration that Spain's opposition to the war does not preclude Spain from taking any action to defend itself. However, because of Spain's recent actions, the United States will look at Spain as an unreliable partner in any type of bilateral relationship or treaties between the nations moving forward; this designation will most likely be a lasting consequence of their relationship with each other until proven otherwise.

The Spectrum of European Responses

Spain's showing of defiance towards Russia is extraordinary. The majority of European nations have taken more ambiguous stances:

The EU3 members (France, Germany and the UK), who were instrumental in developing the 2015 Iran nuclear agreement, have publicly committed to conditional support. Although they have not directly participated in offensive missions, all three have provided defensive assistance and permitted the use of their military installations. As a result of their promise to support regional allies, they find themselves engaged in a greater capacity than their rhetoric would have implied.

Greece has sent two naval units to support Cyprus in territorial defence and therefore aligns itself with the US-led coalition.

Poland and the Baltic nations have been more cautious and have pledged their support for the United States, but have refrained from making major military commitments due to their own vulnerability to Russian aggression.

Austria and Ireland have both agreed with Spain in opposing the operation, but neither country has denied its partners access to bases.

Italy has deployed a missile frigate to provide defence for Cyprus and has also requested that its Gulf allies provide air defence systems; however, neither has been able to determine their level of involvement.

Most Member States have said little, preferring not to take any positions that may alienate Washington or other regional powers.

The incomplete nature of the EU means the EUISS commentary notes that "the absence of a coherent EU position will likely create greater vulnerability for Europe," and that if there is no agreement on how to respond to this situation, both the EU and its member states will be largely observant of others' actions.

The Transatlantic Rift: Washington's Growing Frustration

Increasing tensions in the world, generally speaking, stem from divisions within the region; therefore, these two events are intertwined to some degree. As U.S. President Donald Trump has demanded that European allies pay their fair share of the defence burden, U.S. disapproval has grown steadily as time progresses.

The Jerusalem Post expressed much of that disappointment when it stated: "When global stakes are at their highest, neutrality is really a form of indecisiveness." In conjunction, the article referenced a statement made by a German government representative when NATO leaders rejected President Trump's request for support in opening the Strait of Hormuz: "We feel this is not a matter for NATO/Germany, as the US did not talk to us about this matter before the war."

German Defence Minister Boris Pistorius was much more transparent about feelings towards the situation and stated, "This is not our war; we didn’t start it; and how does Donald Trump expect one or two frigates from Europe to accomplish what the U.S. Navy with its vast capabilities cannot achieve?"

The way Washington views this reaction is basically one of major failures by their coalition partners to view the situation as due diligence. The editorial in question explained that the rationale for the military operation was to "liberate humanity from the shadow of an extremist state that supports terrorism, seeks nuclear arms, and threatens world economic stability." The editorial then posed the question, "If this is not an existential threat to us, then what could be?"

In Trump's opinion, the issue is primarily transactional in nature. For example, he has stated that we receive less than 1% of our oil from the Strait of Hormuz. However, Japan gets around 95%, South Korea gets about 35%, and numerous amounts are going to Europe as well. Therefore, when Washington sought assistance to secure this very critical artery of the global economy, their coalition partners responded with a very lacklustre reaction. They basically said, "Thanks, but no thanks."

They described it as "Countries that largely rely on the stability of the global economy" are " hesitant to defend it" when the threat is direct, when the stakes are immediate, and when there is a strong moral case.

Economic Warfare: Energy Security and the Strait of Hormuz

This conflict's economic ramifications may exceed its military ramifications, especially so for Europe, which relies on energy. Iran has long announced that it can inflict asymmetrical harm to the Strait of Hormuz -- the waterway through which approximately 20% of the world's oil exports and a considerable amount of natural gas flow.

The relatively high level of Iranian rhetoric resulting from its threats to shut down or obstruct the Strait of Hormuz has already had measurable effects. The price of Brent crude oil rose 25% after the commencement of hostilities, and insurance costs for shipping to and from the region increased exponentially due to uncertainty about being able to access the Strait of Hormuz.

Since Europe relies heavily on oil and gas from the Persian Gulf, Iranian analysts say, "a blockade of the Strait of Hormuz would threaten the energy security of Europe if any European nations oppose U.S. operations in the region." The blockade could cause historic spikes in energy prices, economic pressures, and fuel shortages that could lead to a reevaluation of European nations' support of the United States' operations by their respective governments.

European officials have been extremely conscious of the inherent risks that this situation presents. Prime Minister Orbán of Hungary cautioned the European community of the economic harm that this situation poses for Europe due to disruptions in global oil supply shortly after the outbreak of the crisis.

To address these risks, Europe has implemented various initiatives to improve maritime security. Among the new maritime security initiatives rolled out by the EU are Operation Aspides, expanded in the Red Sea and Operation Agenor, a European-led maritime security initiative in cooperation with Gulf states. The current operations and their limitations, however, demonstrate just how reliant the European economy is on a conflict of which it is not a party.

The Diplomatic Path: Iran's Overture and Europe's Opportunity

The military fighting and disruption to the world economy as a result of the conflict have prompted the opening of diplomatic channels, with Europe having a possible role to play. Iranian Foreign Minister Seyed Abbas Araghchi has made a significant effort to re-engage with his European counterparts through the publication of an open letter from the Iranian Foreign Ministry, setting out Iran's grievances and its continuing willingness to negotiate.

In his letter, Araghchi is unusually candid about the deterioration of trust that has occurred since the United States pulled out of its commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2018. He argues that European firms have divested from their commitments to Iran because of United States sanctions, and that there are no benefits which were supposed to have come to Iran from the JCPOA.

In his letter, Araghchi identifies actions taken by European states which Iran sees as negatively impacting relations with Iran. These include,

1. The European Union's ban on the use of Iran Air prevents it from providing humanitarian access to the country.
2. the actions taken by the EU3 under the "snapback' mechanism of the JCPOA, which Iran sees as a source of potential global proliferation crisis; and
3. The habit of EU states to lecture Iran about its human rights violations while at the same time maintaining sanctions which harm Iranian citizens.

In addition, Araghchi has reiterated the long-standing historical relationship between Iran and Europe, citing a long history of "cultural, academic, and economic partnerships" encompassing areas such as energy, technology, automotive and environmental cooperation, as well as continuing commitment to dialogue through multiple invitations extended for meaningful and continued engagement. He has stated he is visiting Paris, Berlin, and London to initiate a new course for diplomatic relations between Iran and Europe and after recent consultations with Russia and China have expressed readiness to do so.

Responses from European capitals have been slow and uncertain. There have been early indications at the deputy foreign minister level that they are willing to conduct preliminary discussions. EU Council President Costa recently said, "The EU will participate in all diplomatic endeavours aimed at de-escalating tensions in the greater Middle East." Yet Araghchi said, “There is very limited time remaining.”

For Europe, the opportunity for diplomatic engagement presents both an opportunity and a challenge. The Analysis from EUISS states, "Europe must act quickly to create a coalition with countries in the Gulf Region, Turkey, the UK, India, China and others to develop an off-ramp for Iran and the United States." Analysts maintain that the most important issue is for Europe to move past the "moral outrage and the assumption that Trump's ill-conceived campaign will end poorly," so they can proactively shape future events.

The Strategic Bottom Line: Europe's Weakness Revealed

What insights do we gain through this crisis concerning where Europe stands globally? The findings are sobering.

Firstly, Europe’s supposed ability to use ‘soft power’ is no longer sufficient for success where hard power (or at least willingness to use hard power) determines success rates (which has been achieved by using the US–Iran Crisis to show European governments simply can make statements such as ‘let us show restraint’ yet they will not be able to make either Washington or Tehran do what they want; as the EUISS Commentary states "you cannot win a match from the outside").

Secondly, Europe still possesses strategic dependency on the US which restricts their independence of choice – even after the “strategic autonomy” aspirations gained prominence during Trump’s first term – and European nations have become involved in a conflict/war they didn’t start due partially to the US having military bases on European territory and being part of NATO which creates de facto entanglements between all these entities that are difficult to break apart.

Thirdly, the internal divisions amongst European countries reflect significant strategic cultures and perceptions of threats and not just disagreement regarding tactics. Spain has a historical aversion to military interventions led by the U.S., making it difficult for it to reconcile their position with both Britain’s Atlanticist position and France’s Gaullist tradition of independent military action. Europe doesn’t have a common defence policy, as they have had discussions on it for many years; therefore, Europe has reacted to, rather than shaped, events.

Fourthly, Europe has a real and growing shortage of resources that’s made obvious by the limitations of the military of countries in Europe due to a lack of investment in them for decades. The opportunity costs of maintaining multiple commitments are also making countries in Europe unable to protect the Gulf, deter Russia in the Baltic, and support Ukraine at the same time, without breaking their capabilities.

Lastly, the crisis has shown how vulnerable the economy of Europe is to attack by being dependent on energy imports from unstable parts of the world. While the military capability of Iran is not at the same level as that of Europe, they have enough leverage through its ability to threaten the Strait of Hormuz, and, therefore, they have a much larger impact on Europe’s policies. Energy independence or diversification has not yet been developed, making European countries vulnerable to this type of pressure.

Conclusion: Europe's Choice

With the ongoing, unevenly balanced military struggle between Iran and the US-Israel alliance, Europe must choose between two paths that will determine Europe's position in the world for a long time.

The first path is to continue being ambiguous and only provide limited military support and/or make statements and hope that the conflict will be resolved without Europe being drawn into war further than it already is. While this option does reduce the chance of an immediate danger or going to war, it allows Europe to play a passive role in the conflict that affects its security, economy and place in the world.

The second path involves Europe taking an active role in resolving the conflict by utilising whatever diplomatic avenues remain, forming alliances with regional countries and offering both Iran and the United States a realistic way out of escalating the situation. This option would require that Europe begin to shape events (not just comment on them), take some risks, commit to an action and realise that neutrality may not be an option in a conflict that has already pulled Europe into its web of interests and territory.

While Europe's weaknesses have been exposed by the crisis, so too have its capabilities. Assets such as French naval might, British commitment or Spanish moral clarity represent significant potential for a coordinated effort by Europe to exert true influence. The overture from Iran indicates that the Iranians view European engagement as a valuable opportunity. The Gulf states, caught between Iran and the U.S., are looking for alternatives to their predicament.

It remains to be seen if Europe will be able to overcome its internal divisions and take on this role. However, the old paradigms of either waiting for the U.S. to lead, hoping crises resolve themselves, or retreating to principled stances when action is needed are no longer viable strategies. The war in Iran has pulled Europe into the conflict. The real question is whether Europe rises to that occasion or simply remains a function of the decisions made by others.